claimer in Section 2 codifies this judicial disavowal." 12 In addition to disclaiming any right to a particular electoral outcome, the statute explicitly emphasizes its concern with procedural fairness by protecting the opportunity of racial minorities to elect candidates of their choice. Section 2's guarantee of procedural fairness extends well beyond the limited procedural protection of an intent standard, however. 13 The 1982 amendment to section 2 represents the congressional response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 1 ' which required successful voting rights plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and under the original language of section 2.15 According to the Senate Report, Congress amended section 2 "to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. ' 'l e The Report explains that under the 12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 16. The House Judiciary Committee also stressed this: "The proposed amendment does not create a right to proportional representation." H.R. REs,. No. Electoral success of minority candidates, while not dispositive, remains relevant to a daim of vote dilution under section 2. The statute itself notes that "the extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office. . . is one circumstance which may be considered ...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1982). The House Report refers to such proof as "highly relevant." HOUSE REPORT at 30. The judicial task of section 2 is, at a minimum, to apply a results test that does not degenerate into a requirement of proportional representation. 634, 652 (1983) . This view of the intent standard is shared by a controlling majority of the Supreme Court. The two leading cases on the need to show discriminatory intent in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[Tlhe invidious quality of a law must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."), and City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (facially neutral state action "violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose"), reveal that the scrutiny is exclusively procedural; as long as the decisionmaking is free from invidious racial considerations, the outcomes are not relevant. Such a procedural focus is, as the plurality in Bolden admits, "wholly negative." Id.
In the words of Professor
To the extent that intent may be inferred from objective factors, however, see, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) ("discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence"), it acquires substantive dimensions. To the same extent it ceases truly to be an intent standard.
14. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
15.
The plurality in Bolden wrote that "it is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment" which "prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote .... Id. at 60, 65 (footnote omitted).
Before the 1982 amendments, section 2 read: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) .
In Judge Goldberg's words, Bolden "completely changed the mode of assessing the legality of electoral schemes alleged to discriminate against a class of citizens. . . ." Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777, 777 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
16. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. The House Report was equally clear in its rejection of the intent standard: "The amendment clarifies the ambiguities which have arisen in the wake of the Bolden decision. It is intended by this clarification that proof of purpose or intent is not a prerequisite to establishing voting discrimination violations in Section 2 cases." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. results test, "the court would assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay behind its adoption or maintenance."' 1 By examining the results of state action, section 2 guarantees minority voters substantive protection from vote dilution. But the guarantee of section 2-that there be no state-imposed, racially-based barriers to the political control of districts-is itself defined in terms of process, rather than substance, as in a specific electoral outcome. Thus, the section 2 right lies between the limited procedural guarantees of an intent standard and the substantive entitlements of proportional representation.
The Senate Report attempts to explain how courts should implement the results test, but the Report's guidance is of little use. Its theory of vote dilution is inadequate for the type of cases for which it was designed-cases involving at-large elections-and is largely irrelevant to racial gerrymandering cases. In defining the results test of section 2 the Report harks back to the pre-Bolden cases:
The proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden. In preBolden cases plaintiffs could prevail by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral process, had the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process." 8 The Senate Report identifies White v. Regester 9 as "the leading preBolden vote dilution case." 20 In White the Supreme Court upheld, for the first time, a district court's finding that multimember districts "operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities."'" Although the Court recited a number of findings made by the district court to support 17. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27. But see Blumstein, supra note 13, at 634 (arguing that "the substantive concept of 'discriminatory effect' stemming from neutral legislation is not only anomalous but also analytically bankrupt"); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 571 (1977) (disproportionate racial impact theory "is not applicable to legislative districting schemes").
Of course, plaintiffs retain the option of showing a violation under section 2 by proving intent. The Senate Report notes that plaintiffs "may establish discriminatory intent for purposes of this section, through direct or indirect circumstantial evidence, including the normal inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant's actions . . ." SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 n.108. 22 . With respect to Dallas County, the district court found a "history of official racial discrimination in Texas, which at times touched the right of Negroes to register and vote and to participate in the democratic processes." 412 U.S. at 766. It also found a majority vote requirement in the primaries, the use of numbered posts (which "enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimination"), and the use of "racial campaign tactics. The second problem with Zimmer follows from the tentativeness of the touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
SENATE REPORT
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution. These limitations are problems with Zimmer per se. The most severe limitation of Zimmer, however, is that its factors were conceived and developed solely in response to situations involving at-large election systems, which submerge concentrations of minority voters sufficient to elect representatives within larger, majority white, multimember districts. 3 " The legislative history of section 2 suffers from the same narrow focus. 37 This concentration on at-large systems accurately reflects the course of voting rights litigation over the past decade, 8 but is poorly suited to the emerging focus on racial gerrymandering.
Id
As defined by Robert Dixon, "[glerrymandering is simply discriminatory districting which operates unfairly to inflate the political strength of one group and deflate that of another." 3 9 The impact of gerrymandering 34. 571 F.2d at 233 (Wisdom, J., specially concurring). Blacksher and Menefee also suggest this problem: "Most of the cases concluding under the White-Zimnmner guidelines that at-large schemes were constitutional cannot be distinguished analytically from those reaching a contrary result on any basis other than the varying personal political views of the trial and appellate judges who decided them." Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 23, at 43.
At least one commentator has added the complaint that "the only manageable parameter" in Zinmer is the proportion of minorities elected, thus amounting to "an implicit recognition of a right to proportional representation. In September, 1983, a three-judge court in Louisiana applying section 2 to a racial gerrymandering challenge explained that: "Dilution jurisprudence has evolved primarily in the context of constitutional challenges to state at-large or multimember districts." Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 342 n.22 (E.D. La. 1983).
37. Significantly, in the Judiciary Committee's discussion of the law prior to Bolden (SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19-24), the only reference to a racial gerrymandering case was in a footnote to explain that in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), the plaintiffs had failed to allege discriminatory impact. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19 n.60. It is, however, quite beyond contention that section 2 is intended to apply to legislative districting challenges as well as to atlarge election systems. Both the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 30-31 and the SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 12 n.31, explicitly refer to discriminatory districting.
38. See N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at B7, col. 6. In a polarized polity, all districting allocates electoral power by dividing some groups and uniting others. Consider, for example, the 1981 redistricting of the Chicago aldermanic district. The map proposed by the city combined the classic gerrymander techniques of "fracturing"-slicing off significant portions of the black community into white majority wards-and "packing"-concentrating the black population into a few wards-in order to reduce the number of black majority districts from 19 to 17. Without violating the independent constitutional mandate of equipopulous districts, 45 plaintiffs proposed alternative maps with 20, 21, and 22 black majority districts. 46 The opportunities for gerrymandering are obviously legion.
39.
To be sure, the courts have not been silent on the extension of Zimmer 
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to racial gerrymandering. The Fifth Circuit explained that the "tests should be the same whether the right to an equally effective vote is denied by drawing district lines or erasing them . . ."' But while the manipulation of single-member district lines, like the use of at-large systems, can have discriminatory results, these two electoral structures function to dilute minority strength in distinct ways. In addition to the general submersion of minority voters in large white concentrations, at-large systems frequently use techniques such as majority-vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions, and numbered places 4 8 in the context of multimember districts to accentuate the winner-take-all characteristics of majoritarian voting. As a result, when an at-large scheme operates discriminatorily, minority voters are "effectively removed from the political processes," 49 and the denial of access is complete. A racial gerrymander, by contrast, is more likely to reduce, rather than deny, electoral opportunity. Racial gerrymandering is consequently more difficult to detect.
Some of the Zimmer factors-those which focus on electoral structure-simply have no relation to single-member districting. 50 The remaining factors are important to establish the social context, but, since they are independent of any particular district configuration, they can provide no insight into the relative merits of various districting plans. The Fifth Circuit apparently recognized this in Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors. 51 In Kirksey, the court used the Zimmer factors to show that blacks were historically denied access to the political process in Hinds County, Mississippi. 5 2 In order to determine whether the particular districting scheme at issue had "the effect of perpetuating the denial of access," 5 ' however, the Kirksey court left Zimmer behind and examined the placement of particular district lines with respect to the black community." This type of 47 The central limitation of section 2, then, is that in failing to articulate a theory of equal electoral opportunity, it ultimately offers little guidance for those courts seeking to depart from the Zimmer factors. In the following section, this Note will elaborate such a theory consistent with the language of section 2. 5 '
II. DERIVING A STANDARD FOR RACIAL GERRYMANDERING

A. A Group Theory of Equal Electoral Opportunity
Section 2, as amended, creates a right to equal electoral opportunity, a right for "members of a [protected] class" to have equal "opportunity... to elect representatives of their choice." 5 8 Although the reference to group "members" could prompt an individualistic interpretation, both legislative and judicial history suggest that section 2 creates group rights reaching far beyond the rights of individuals to register and to vote.
The power to elect representatives is necessarily a group power. 5 9 The an act establishing the boundaries between two congressional districts. The court found that the boundary line "slices through the City's traditional political subunit, the ward, in a racially selective manner, leaving intact predominantly white wards while carving up those densely populated by blacks." Major v. 57. Because it operates at a higher level of generality than the Zimmer-Senate factors, the theoretical treatment that follows could apply with equal force to problems of at-large systems. The legislative history speaks relatively dearly with respect to at-large elections, however, and thus provides less support for departing from Zimmer in that area.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982 The case law supports this notion of a group right. As stated in Kirksey, the Zimmer factors, which must be consistent with any coherent theory of section 2,6" "are more relevant to whether a group has input into the political decision-making process than to whether a particular individual is free to vote." 62 Racial groupings will not, however, always be relevant in politics. In fact, the ambition behind the Voting Rights Act is to create a society where race is a wholly irrelevant political criterion. 6 " Racially polarized politics distinguishes the real from the ideal. Where race is a salient political factor, group members will act substantially in concert, racial groupings will have an independent political existence, and a theory of racial group disadvantaging can make sense. Where race is not relevant and racial bloc voting does not occur, electoral cleavage lines would cross rather than track racial lines. Thus, racially polarized voting "will ordinarily be the keystone of a dilution case." ' 66. This limiting principle can be found in both the judicial and legislative histories of section 2. See, e.g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 880 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Evidence of racial polarization in voting has been held to be a prerequisite to a voting dilution challenge."); SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 33.
Racial polarization appears to be widespread. The authors of one seventeen-year study of the five largest southern cities concluded that "voting in large Southern cities tends to follow racial lines," especially when blacks run as candidates. Murray & Vedlitz, Racial Voting Patterns in the South, 439 ANNALS 29, 33 (1978).
Racial polarization is not, however, to be assumed. According to the Senate Report, "[tihe results test makes no assumptions one way or the other about the role of racial political considerations in a particular community." SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 34 (emphasis in original). For the purposes of litigation under section 2, whether racial polarization exists in a given polity must be estab-The existence in a case of sufficient racial polarization"' allows the concept of equal electoral opportunity to be analyzed in group terms. Where groups of differing size are involved, equality translates into proportionality. If the opportunity of groups to elect representatives of their choice were disproportionate to group size, members of differing size groups would possess unequal electoral power. In a racially polarized polity divided into single-member districts, a racial minority will be able to elect representatives only if it constitutes a controlling majority in certain districts."' Where blacks are a numerical minority, racial bloc voting means that blacks must back either a white-supported candidate or a loser. 6 9
B. A New Standard For Racial Gerrymandering
The group theory of equal opportunity leads to a straightforward standard for measuring and remedying vote dilution in a racially polarized multi-ward polity: Minority groups must have the ability to control the elections in as near to a proportional number of wards as is feasible. Both "ability to control" and "feasible" require further definition.
In the context of single-member districting, the phrase "ability to control" captures the essential tension of section 2 created by substantive guarantees of procedurally defined outcomes. To make electoral opportulished, as federal courts have often done, on a case-by-case basis. The Senate Report makes it clear that the burden of proving racial polarization rests with the plaintiffs. Id. at 34. Statistical evidence of racial bloc voting is of primary importance in establishing the requisite racial polarization. To support the statistical evidence, plaintiffs could also present evidence of some of the Zinmer-Senate factors: racial appeals in past campaigns, a history of official discrimination in voting or politics, present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 28-29.
Racial polarization should be seen as an attribute not of a single election, but rather of a polity viewed over time. The concern is necessarily temporal and the analysis historical because the evil to be avoided is the subordination of minority groups in American politics, not the defeat of individuals in particular electoral contests. Cf Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151 n.67 (1976) (concern about caste effects involves "[tihe critical temporal issue . . . of duration").
67. It is important to recognize that racial polarization is a question of degree. At some point along the continuum from absolute polarization to nonpolarization, the degree of polarity becomes insufficient to support a claim of racial vote dilution. Similarly, lesser variations from the absolute may require some scaling of the remedy. In either case, however, the determination is fact-specific, and must be committed to case-by-case analysis.
68. See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 339 (E.D. La. 1983) ("Racial bloc voting, in the context of an electoral structure wherein the number of votes needed for election exceeds the number of black voters, substantially diminishes the opportunity for black voters to elect the candidate of their choice."). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 33 ("In the context of. . . racial bloc voting a particular election method can deny minority voters equal opportunity.").
See Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting
Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 574 (1978) (in certain contexts, "racial bloc voting ensures that a nonwhite minority will never, in fact, influence any election"). See also Seamon v. Upham, No. P-81-49-CA, slip op. at 4-5, (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1984) (three-judge court) (Steger, J., dissenting) (the court's holding limits minority citizens to deciding "between candidates previously selected by the white majorities of the competing political parties").
Moreover, where politics is racially polarized, minority group members will be able to influence representatives only if they can elect them. nity equal, all racially-based handicaps-the legacies of past and present purposeful and societal discrimination and the electoral structures that exploit them-must be compensated for. 70 The courts have repeatedly held that the lower levels of minority registration and turnout ' 1 are attributable to past discrimination. 72 Consequently, minority control of districts requires a "supermajority"-more than a simple population majority.
73
This fact has long been accepted by courts remedying at-large election systems or redrawing district lines, and most courts 4 have adopted a benchmark supermajority figure of 65 percent population (60 percent voting age population) 7 5 in defining "safe" districts.
Section 2, however, is concerned with opportunity. Thus while safe districts may be required, 7 guaranteed districts are prohibited. Courts have been remarkably successful at treading the fine line between the two. Under the Voting Rights Act, the ideal supermajority level is that at 77. Some have suggested that this line is nonexistent. See Fiss, supra note 66, at 154 ("A just political process would be one in which blacks would have 'more' of a voice than they in fact do, but not necessarily one in which they would 'win.' In a sense there is a remedial lacuna; a pure process claim cannot determine substantive outcomes."). which a minority-supported candidate's defeat could not be attributable to his or her race or the race of his or her supporters: The Act stops short of shielding candidates from defeat on the merits, or because of inadequate organization, campaigning, or appeal. 8 Minority candidates have frequently been elected from redrawn districts, but despite compensation for the statistical disparities, their success has been far from automatic. 79 Thus, giving minority voters the ability to control districts under the standard proposed here is not equivalent either in theory or practice to requiring proportional representation.
Moreover, arithmetic and demographic constraints may make fully proportional representation "infeasible" in some cases. The arithmetic constraint is that the supermajority requirement may itself preclude control over a proportional number of wards. 80 The demographic constraint is a function of the degree of residential integration in the polity combined with the minimal level of geographic compactness necessary for the effective operation of political districts. 8 " The more dispersed the minority population, the less likely that full proportional control will be possible. If, to take an extreme case, the black population of a city that is forty percent black were spread evenly throughout the city, it would be impossible to construct contiguous black-majority districts, let alone supermajority districts. 8 2 The standard for evaluating legislative districting under this theory of section 2's guarantee of equal electoral opportunity can thus be refined and restated as follows: In a racially polarized polity, courts should hold that districting schemes in which a minority group does not possess the necessary supermajority in a proportional number of wardsunless demographically or arithmetically infeasible-violate section 2.
Although central to the application of section 2 to legislative districting, the supermajority concept is not without costs. But the costs are, on the 78. Turnout and registration figures should be calculated across time periods of considerable length so that they do not reflect poor organization, etc., except where it is endemic, and thus likely itself to be a legacy of discrimination.
79. Despite the creation of two "safe" districts in Brooklyn after United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the black community failed to elect a candidate of its choice. The same is often true, at least at first, in redrawn districts in the Deep South.
80. Even where the demographic factors permit a proportional number of majority-black wards to be constructed, the minority population might not be sufficiently concentrated to create as many supermajority wards as would be appropriate.
81. Since the Voting Rights Act is only a transitional stage toward full integration of minorities into American politics, it is important that the development of minority political organization not be thwarted. Compact, contiguous districts facilitate "political organization, electoral campaigning, and constituent representation. 
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whole, less than frequently supposed. The use of safe districts has been condemned for disenfranchising those "living in a district made safe for others" and affording out-of-district minorities only virtual representation. 83 In fact, safe districts are premised on a group theory of electoral opportunity, as is section 2 generally. The application of this theory necessarily affects both out-of-district minorities and in-district nonminorities. While a group theory constitutes a compromise of the traditional American approach to representation, it is one that the Supreme Court has accepted in this context. 8 4 More basically, one must question whether the "traditional approach" is appropriate in the face of racial politics and racial disparities. 8 It has also been noted that the retention of legislative districting instead of, for example, resort to a cumulative voting system, limits relief to only a few groups. 8 The problem of choosing beneficiary groups is overstated; both the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment provide guides for this choice. 8 7 The more fundamental issue is the decision to address the exclusion of blacks from the political system independent of a broader assault on the underpinnings of the system. This decision rests on an empirical judgment that the experience of blacks in American electoral politics is anomolous, rather than paradigmatic. Finally, some commentators argue that safe districting, like all forms of affirmative action, damages the "fairness and integrity of the political process."'" Their concern with fairness is particularly appropriate here because voting is central to the political process and is itself a protected right. 2 The remedy proposed here, however, respects the existing political process and falls short of guaranteeing electoral outcomes. More fundamentally, the issue of fairness is a function of perspective. While the costs imposed by affirmatively gerrymandered districts are real and nontrivial, they pale in comparison with the alternative: nothing less than a society where political power is perpetually stratified along racial lines. 93 This is precisely the evil which section 2 was designed to combat.
has treated its black minority . . . is more than sufficient to prove" that pluralist model does not always work); see also Cover, supra note 88, at 1296 (" 'Discrete and insular' minorities are not simply losers in the political arena, they are perpetual losers."). If, on the other hand, blacks were more the paradigm than the anomoly, a more wholesale response would be appropriate. For an argument that starts from this premise and advocates the adoption of a pure proportional representation system, see Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163 (1984). 93. Some might claim that perpetuation of racial polarization would itself be a cost of § 2 as here defined. The argument is that official recognition of racial polarization and the construction of "segregated" districts would function to exacerbate the existing levels of polarization by heightening race consciousness. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[B]y making race a relevant criterion once again in its own affairs the Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to race • . . and that people can, and perhaps should, view themselves and others in terms of their racial characteristics."). This objection, while not without force, fails to note that safe districting promotes integration in legislative bodies, thus overcoming centuries of exclusion. Moreover, its implicit counterfactual-that without safe districting, racial polarization will subside-is untenable. The refusal to redress the continuing subordination of blacks in American politics is more likely to increase conflict. An alternative outcome, equally unacceptable, is that alienation and anomie will cause blacks to completely remove themselves from politics. Thus, the relevant question to be asked about the costs of safe districting is: compared to what? Furthermore, as black political organizations mature and proliferate, the necessary supermajorities will decline and political districts will be able to become more integrated. The real obstacle to this is residential segregation, which has been a cause, but not an effect, of political district lines.
At the most basic level, it should not be forgotten that the relative harms of violation and remedy were weighed by the Congress when it amended § 2. As the three-judge court in Gingles v. Edmisten explained:
Congress necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as outweighed,. . the risk that creating "safe" black-majority single-member districts would perpetuate racial ghettos and racial polarization in voting behavior; . . . and the fundamental risk that the recognition of "group voting rights" and the imposing of affirmative obligation upon government to secure those rights by race-conscious electoral mechanisms was alien to the American political tradition.
No. 81-803-CIV-5, slip op. at 20-21 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 1984) (footnotes omitted).
C. Applying Section 2 to Racial Gerrymandering
Substantive guarantees of procedurally defined outcomes present conceptual problems of proof which do not arise under an intent test or a proportional representation model. The difficulty lies in measuring opportunity from the perspective of the minority group, rather than, as under an intent test, from that of the legislator. The Zimmer factors are not well suited for this task either, particularly in the context of racial gerrymandering. 94 This section suggests a different procedure for proving violations of section 2.
The language of section 2 suggests that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office" is one important factor. 5 But both the legislative and judicial history make it plain that "plaintiffs [have] to prove more than" mere disparity between population proportion and representation in the legislature." 6 This follows as well from the theory articulated above, since it is only in the context of racial polarization that racial vote dilution is a meaningful threat." 7 Together, however, these two factors-disparity and racial polarization-should be sufficient to raise the presumption that proportional electoral opportunity does not exist, 9 8 and to shift the burden of proof to defendants. Consistent with the theory of equal electoral opportunity, defendants could rebut this presumption by showing that the failure to achieve proportionality was due either to non-racially based handicaps, 9 " or to arithmetic or demographic constraints. 10 0 There are two reasons for shifting the burden of proof after the prima facie showing. First, as an empirical matter, the inference drawn from disproportionate outcomes where race is a salient political factor is likely to be correct. 1 " 1 Indeed, where such disproportionate outcomes occur, the Fifth Circuit has held that without evidence to the contrary, "a court may not simply attribute present disproportions to lack of interest or apathy on the part of blacks." 10 2 The presence of racial polarization suggests that past discrimination has present effects. Second, in the presence of racial disparities and racial politics, it is preferable that the burden of the unproven case fall on the state: better to require needless redistricting than to permit a violation to remain unremedied.' 0 3 Our concern with racial justice and eradicating the effects of past, pervasive discrimination outweighs the competing interests of federalism and administrative convenience. This relative valuation is made by the Voting Rights Act itself, which compels all jurisdictions with a history of low minority-voter participation and discriminatory registration tests to preclear all proposed voting or electoral changes with the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.1 0 4 The prima facie showing under section 2 should likewise function to shift the inertia away from the status quo.
Since shifting the burden does not resolve the case, it also does not redefine the right in terms of outcomes. Shifting the burden does not, therefore, smuggle a lower standard of proof into section 2. For even if plaintiffs establish the threshold facts of racial polarization and disparity in electoral success, defendants may disprove the presumed fact-inequality of opportunity. Justifications, however, are irrelevant. Unless the defendant can show that as a matter of fact the plaintiffs are not denied equal electoral opportunity, the plaintiff prevails.
III. THE RESULTS TEST COMPARED
The preceding section offers a plausible interpretation of section 2, but not one that is in any way compelled by the text. The following section will demonstrate the superiority of the interpretation advanced here over competing theories of proportional representation and intent.
The focus on "results" contained in section 2 is both distinct from, and more appropriate than, defining rights in terms of substantive entitlements or negative process guarantees. First, as noted above, the Voting Rights Act stops short of guaranteeing any particular electoral outcomes. Not only is such an approach disclaimed by the statutory language, 10 it is also inconsistent with our notions of political democracy. Any scheme that entirely predetermined the outcomes of elections would obliterate their significance. In the same way, a system that necessarily elected a fixed percentage of black and white representatives would significantly constrain the choices of all citizens, and would inevitably perpetuate racial polarization. In consequence, the political autonomy of minority citizens would be denied by the very Act intended to protect it. Under section 2's guarantee, however, each ward or district can choose to be represented by a politician of any race or political persuasion. The core concern of section 2 is not that minorities necessarily be candidates, but that minorities control their representatives. Whatever instrumental value controlling representatives might have, there is an intrinsic value to a voice in the legislature.
Second, the results test provides more than freedom from purposeful discrimination, as in the prevailing constitutional standard."' The violation under section 2 is defined in terms of conditions rather than actions, and one therefore compares actual with potential states rather than invidious with acceptable motives. The constitutional intent test fails to provide adequate safeguards against vote dilution since it poses the wrong question. It "diverts the judicial [inquiry] . . .from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a historical question of individual motives.1 107 Even on its own terms the intent test could not work for racial gerrymandering. Quite often in redistricting, legislators are concerned with preserving incumbency. While this has been held not to be per se invidious, 1 0 8 the effect of such motivation ceases to be benign when its price is the dilution of minority voting strength. As so often happens, "the requirements of incumbency are so closely intertwined with the need for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district • . . is virtually coterminus with a purpose to practice racial discrimination." 1 09 In any event, because "an accidental gerrymander can be just as devastating as one which emanates from a secret chart room," 1 1 0 the broader guarantees of the results test are needed.
Moreover, the results test of section 2 embraces more than the individual notion of causation associated with the intent standard. 1 It recognizes that structures and institutions may also disadvantage determinate groups and thus interfere with procedural fairness. In so doing, the results test better comports with the notion central to a commitment to racial justice: that law should redress not only ongoing discrimination, but also the institutionalized and cumulative effects of past purposeful, legalized, and constitutionalized discrimination. The absence of racial animus is but one element of race neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Unlike the Zimmer factors, the test proposed here relates directly to the right in question, and specifically addresses the problem of racial gerrymandering. Most important, it offers the courts an objective, external standard-supermajorities in a proportional number of wards-by which to evaluate the adequacy of alternative districting plans. Absent such a standard, claims" of racial gerrymandering will continue to be adjudicated in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner. The right to equal electoral opportunity must not vary according to the political ideology of the trial judge.
The results test of section 2, with its broadened conception of equality of opportunity, promises minority groups full integration into American electoral politics. The standards articulated in this Note are designed to facilitate challenges to districting systems that deny this vision. 
